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Only a few rich nations are currently at replacement levels of fertility and many are considerably below.
 We believe that changes in the status of women are driving fertility change.  At low levels of female
status, women specialize in household production and fertility is high.  In an intermediate phase, women
have increasing opportunities to earn a living outside the home yet still shoulder the bulk of household
production.  Fertility is at a minimum in this regime due to the increased opportunity cost in women's
foregone wages with no decrease in time allocated to childcare.  We see the lowest fertility nations
(Japan, Spain, Italy) as being in this regime.  At even higher levels of women's status, men begin to
share in the burden of child care at home and fertility is higher than in the middle regime.  This progression
has been observed in the US, Sweden and other countries.  Using ISSP and World Values Survey data
we show that countries in which men perform relatively more of the childcare and household production
(and where female labor force participation was highest 30 years ago) have the highest fertility within
the rich country sample.  Fertility and women's labor force participation have become positively correlated
across high income countries.  The trend in men's household work suggests that the low fertility countries
may see increases in fertility as women's household status catches up to their workforce opportunities.
We also note that as the poor nations of the world undergo the demographic transition they appear
to be reducing fertility faster and further than the current rich countries did at similar levels of income.
 By examining fertility differences between the rich nations we may be able to gain insight into where
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  The last 30 years have witnessed a social change unprecedented in human history: a 
variety of high-income nations have experienced fertility declines so large that these countries 
are far below replacement-level fertility. Total fertility rates in 2005 are as low as 1.3 children 
per woman in Italy, Spain, Germany, and Japan (according to <http://unstats.un.org/>). Within 
the high-income countries of the world, no countries are solidly above the fertility rate of 2.1 
children per women that is needed to replace the population at a constant level, with only the 
United States, New Zealand, Ireland, Iceland, and France above 1.9 children per woman. 
Absent any change in immigration policy, populations in Italy, Spain, and Germany will all be 
declining within the next two decades. Japan’s population began declining in 2005 and will 
continue to fall for the indefinite future. While other cultures have had brief episodes of less-
than-replacement-level fertility, this is the first time in recorded history that large populations 
with high and growing per capita income have failed to reproduce themselves over an extended 
period of time. 
  This phenomenon is unlikely to be restricted to the currently high-income countries. 
Fertility rates in the majority of developing countries are rapidly moving toward levels below 
replacement. If recent evidence from Asia offers any indication, developing countries may be 
on a trajectory toward lower long-run fertility than high-income countries. Korea, Singapore, 
and Hong Kong all have estimated total fertility rates below 1.5 children per women in 2005, 
compared to values in the range of 3.5 to 6.0 children per woman in 1970. Chinese total 
fertility rates are near replacement levels nationally and substantially below replacement levels 
in urban areas. Hong Kong has the lowest fertility rate in the world at 1.0 child per woman. 
India’s current fertility rate of about 3.2 children per women is above replacement rate, but 
represents a substantial decline from the 4.5 children per woman rate of 20 years ago.  
  As fertility rates around the world rapidly converge towards the fertility rates of the 
high-income nations, it seems useful to investigate why some why some high-income nations 
have birth rates near replacement level while others are substantially below. We consider a 
variety of possible theories to explain the differences in fertility rates across high-income 
countries. Our particular focus is on how increases in women’s status over time affect fertility.  
Our underlying assumption is that certain forces that are exogenous with regards to 
fertility are increasing the opportunities of women in the workforce. One mechanism may be   3
technological change that favors human capital over physical labor (Galor and Weil, 1996). 
Assuming that women are at a comparative disadvantage in physical labor, this gradual change 
will tend to increase relative wages for women over time. This increase in women’s labor force 
opportunities interacts with preexisting social attitudes about the relative status of women at 
home.  
We assume that technological trends are increasing labor market opportunities 
everywhere, but that predetermined social differences will generate heterogeneity in the timing 
of changes in female status on a country-by-country basis. In particular, we are interested in the 
interaction between the increasing status of women in the workforce and their status in the 
household, particularly with regards to child care and home production. The latter may be more 
affected by longstanding societal attitudes than the former.  
  We observe three distinct phases in women’s status generated by the gradual increase in 
women’s workforce opportunities. In the earliest phase, characteristic of the 1950s and 1960s 
in the United States, women earn low wages relative to men and are expected to shoulder all of 
the child care at home. As a result, most women specialize in home production and raising 
children. 
  In an intermediate category, women have improved (but not equal) labor market 
opportunities but their household status lags. Women in this stage are still expected to do the 
majority of child care and household production. Increasing access to market work increases 
the opportunity cost of having children and fertility falls. Female labor force participation 
increases. Working women in this phase of development have the strongest disincentives to 
having additional children since the entire burden of child care falls on them. 
  In the final phase of development, women’s labor market opportunities begin to equal 
those of men. In addition, the increased household bargaining power that comes from more 
equal wages results in much higher (if not gender-equal) male participation in household 
production.
2 Female labor force participation is higher than in the intermediate phase. The 
increased participation of men in the household also reduces the disincentives for women to 
have additional children, and fertility rates rise compared to the intermediate phase. 
                                                 
2 It is also reasonable to think that social attitudes move more slowly than the labor market in recognizing 
the changing role of women.   4
The intermediate, low-fertility phase might describe Japan, Italy, and Spain in the 
present day. Labor market opportunities for women in these countries (as proxied by 
participation rates) are somewhat lower than the other high-income countries, but more 
importantly, the participation of men in household production is much lower in these countries. 
The Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, and the modern-day United States may be 
entering the final phase. Male participation in household production is relatively high (and 
rising) in these countries, and fertility has risen modestly over the last decade or so despite 
continued increases in female participation rates.  
  This framework can explain at least two key facts in the data: First, high-income 
countries such as Italy, Spain, Germany, and Japan, where men do the smallest fraction of the 
household chores and child care (as detailed in the next section), are also the high-income 
countries with the lowest fertility rates. Second, within the high-income countries, the cross-
country relationship between fertility and labor force participation has changed markedly over 
the last 40 years. In the 1960s and even 1970s, fertility rates and labor force participation rates 
were negatively correlated across countries. In the most recent data, the two rates are positively 
correlated. 
  We think that causality is running from changes in female status to fertility, not the 
other way around. The heterogeneity in women’s status is generated by two factors. First, 
changes in the nature of work are raising the relative wages of women in the workforce over 
time. These changes are a byproduct of human-capital-augmenting technological change and 
are therefore exogenous with regards to fertility. Second, heterogeneity between countries is 
driven by longstanding cultural differences which move more slowly than fertility rates. In the 
long run, cultural attitudes are being driven by common fundamental economic forces, but in 
the short run, cultural differences generate timing differences. 
Therefore, the increase in women’s status may eventually reverse fertility trends in 
Europe and Japan. In particular, men in all high-income countries appear to be taking on a 
larger share of household duties, which could lead to a large positive increase in fertility.  
  We also explore various possible market causes of differences in fertility across time 
and across developed countries, namely population density and housing prices, but find little 
evidence that these factors matter much. We do find that policies that reduce the burden of 
caring for children make a difference. Government spending on family support and publicly   5
provided day-care services is positively correlated with fertility. This result is consistent with 
the notion that reducing the household cost of having children increases fertility. 
  However, given the large cost of raising a child in wealthy, modern societies, it is 
somewhat hard to believe that the current subsidy levels can make a significant impact. Peer 
effects may play an important role. Because many people imitate their friends, siblings, and 
parents in choosing their number of children (Fernandez and Fogli, 2006), policies or 
exogenous shocks that have modest effects on fertility at the individual level may have very 
large impacts at the macro level thanks to peer effects. This social multiplier could work 
through a variety of mechanisms in addition to simple imitation. Societies with larger numbers 
of children may develop more family-friendly infrastructure. Businesses in high fertility 
countries may cater more to families. This hypothesis also implies that when the pendulum in 
Italy, Japan, Germany, and Spain swings back towards higher fertility, it may swing far enough 
that these countries could have a baby boom in later decades.  
 
Birth Rate Trends and Patterns 
 
  Our analysis will make repeated use of some key conceptual terms: birth rate, total 
fertility rate, and completed fertility rate. A birth rate is the number of children born to a group 
of women in a given year divided by the group size.  
To calculate a total fertility rate for a given year, one first calculates birth rates by age 
for all women of child-bearing age (for example, ages 15–45). The total fertility rate is the sum 
of these birthrates by age. Conceptually the total fertility rate is the number of children a 
woman entering her child-bearing years would expect to have if the expected number of births 
during each year of her life were equal to the current age-specific birth rates being experienced 
by women of child-bearing ages in the current year. A total fertility rate of 2.1 births per 
woman is estimated to be the rate at which the population of developed nations will replace 
itself; the replacement rate is slightly above 2.0 children per woman because of infant and child 
mortality.  
  Completed fertility rates are a simpler concept: one computes the number of births per 
woman for women who have completed their child-bearing years. For example, in Spain 
completed fertility for women born in 1940 is equal to 2.9 compared to 1.6 for women born in   6
1963. In our calculations, completed fertility for both cohorts excludes births to women 45 and 
older, though the number of such births is small relative to the mean. Completed fertility rates 
reveal the actual experience for an identifiable group of women. But completed fertility rates 
by definition ignore available information on fertility for women who are currently in their 
child-bearing years. Total fertility rates have the disadvantage of summing across different 
cohorts of women who may have different age-specific fertility rates, but have the advantage of 
incorporating the most recent information on birth rates for women of child-bearing age in the 
population.
3 
  Figure 1 shows total fertility rates over time for the United States, France, Germany, 
Italy, and Japan. The United States in 1955 has a total fertility rate of about 3.5 births per 
woman. This rate falls quite rapidly throughout the 1960s and 1970s and flattens out in the 
1980s at roughly 1.8 births per woman. Total fertility then rises modestly during the 1990s and 
reaches roughly replacement level by 1995.  
  Total fertility in France is 2.7 births per woman in 1955 and declines steadily until 1995 
to 1.7. At this point, the trend reverses and total fertility climbs to 1.9 births per woman. What 
is behind the increase in fertility in France? While definitive causal statements are impossible, 
it is widely believed that the French government was able to engineer increased fertility by 
offering a combination of more generous tax incentives to families with children, more 
generous maternity leave, and several forms of subsidized day care (Moore, 2006). Gatenio-
Gabel and Kamerman (2006) calculate that annual federal subsidies per child in France rose 
from $1,793 per child in 1980 to $3,056 per child in 2000 (calculated in 1995 purchasing 
power parity dollars). These incentives, working together with a social multiplier effect 
(Maurin and Moschion, 2006), may explain some of the increase in French fertility. 
  In contrast to the French experience, total fertility in Japan, Italy, and Germany has 
continued to decline and in 2005 was down to 1.3 children per woman. Italy decreased its 
federal subsidies per child from 1980 to 2000, while Germany increased subsidies per child 67 
percent to $2,216 (Gatenio-Gabel and Kamerman, 2006).  
 
                                                 
3 Because total fertility rates are an average over many cohorts, these rates are known to be biased 
downward if there is a trend toward fertility occurring later in a woman’s life. However, the low fertility 
rates in the high-income countries are sufficiently persistent that the observed changes cannot be explained 
by timing effects.   7
Convergence in Fertility Rates  
  The most striking fact about fertility rates across countries is the degree of absolute 
convergence. Regardless of income levels or income growth, countries around the world 
appear to be heading toward a total fertility rate of something less than 2 children per woman. 
We show this graphically in Figure 2, using United Nations data on total fertility in 1970 and 
2000 for 110 countries. The x-axis is the total fertility rate in 1970 and the y-axis is the change 
from 1970 to 2000. Almost every country saw a decrease in total fertility during the 30-year 
period, and these decreases were linearly related to the initial level. Countries that had 1970 
total fertility rates of 4–5 children per woman had decreases on the order of 2–3 children per 
woman over the subsequent 30 years (for example, Cuba, Chile, and Fiji). Countries with 1970 
fertility in the range of 3–4 children per woman had decreases on the order of 1 to 2.2 children 
per woman over the same period (for example, China, Portugal, Romania, and New Zealand). 
The countries in the upper right of Figure 2 are countries that had small fertility decreases 
given their initial level. Countries in sub-Saharan Africa are overrepresented in this group. 
Though there is a clear negative relationship between income and fertility levels (the 
correlation in the cross-section is –0.65), convergence in fertility rates has occurred despite a 
lack of convergence in income per capita. The initial level of fertility is by far the most 
important right-hand-side variable in any attempt to understand changes in fertility rates across 
the full set of countries for which we have data.
4  
 
Extensive Versus Intensive Margins  
  How much of the long-run decrease in fertility has come from fewer women having any 
children (the extensive margin) versus the number of children per woman among those that 
have any (the intensive margin)? Both margins are important and the answer varies country by 
country. We compared completed fertility rates for 15 high-income countries for women born 
in 1940 and women born in 1963. (The latter group is the youngest cohort of women for which 
we can reliably estimate completed fertility since they are 44 years old in 2007.) For each 
country, we decomposed the total change in completed fertility into the portion attributable to 
                                                 
4 For more details on convergence in fertility rates across countries, see Appendix Table A1, available with 
this paper at <http://www.e-jep.org>.   8
the change in the number of women having any children and the portion attributable to the 
change in children per women conditional on having children.
5 
  At one extreme, Ireland saw a drop in total fertility of 1.37 births per woman from the 
1940 cohort to the 1963 cohort. The bulk of the change in Ireland (0.99 of the 1.37) was 
attributable to the intensive margin and the rest was attributable to fewer women having 
children at all. In contrast, Germany had a drop of 0.59 births per woman, and this was nearly 
all due to the extensive margin. In 10 of the 14 countries we considered (Ireland, Spain, 
Portugal, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Italy, Iceland, Norway, and Denmark), the intensive 
change in fertility was greater than the extensive; in the other four countries (West Germany, 
United Kingdom, Finland, and Sweden) the extensive margin was larger. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the intensive margin plays a larger role for the countries with the largest decreases 
in completed fertility over the period: Ireland, Spain, and Portugal. 
 
Determinants of Fertility: Men’s Work at Home, Women’s Market Work, and Childcare 
Subsidies  
 
  The twentieth-century decrease in fertility in high-income countries is commonly 
associated with five major factors: 1) increases in the demand for human capital (Galor and 
Weil, 2000), which increased the desire of parents to produce high-human-capital children; 2) 
increases in income which increased the opportunity cost of men’s and women’s time (Becker, 
1981); 3) the long-run increase in women’s labor force participation (Mira and Ahn, 2002; 
Brewster and Rindfuss, 2000); 4) declines in childhood mortality; and 5) the availability of 
easy-to-use and effective contraception for women (Goldin and Katz, 2000, 2002).
6 However, 
we argue that the changes brought about by the pill or associated with the first waves of 
women entering the work force en masse had largely played themselves out by the 1990s, and 
                                                 
5 For a detailed breakdown of these figures by country, see Appendix Table A2, available with this paper at 
<http://www.e-jep.org>. Completed fertility rates are calculated from birth records data available from 
Eurostat at <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu>. We ignore births to women 45 and older in this table in 
order to estimate completed fertility for the most recent cohort possible. 
6 Galor (2005) argues from both empirical and theoretical grounds that the demand for human capital is a 
more plausible explanation for the demographic transition than a pure income effect or a childhood 
mortality effect. The association between women’s labor force participation and fertility could work 
through an increase in the opportunity cost of women’s time relative to men’s if the gender gap is 
narrowing at the same time that women are entering the workforce (Galor and Weil 1996).   9
so these factors do little to explain the substantial cross-sectional differences in fertility across 
the high-income countries in the early twenty-first century. 
 
Female Labor Force Participation and Fertility Rates 
Higher female labor force participation is generally associated with lower fertility. For 
illustration, Figure 3 plots female labor force participation versus total fertility rates for 83 
countries in 1995. The relationship is highly significant. A ten-percentage-point increase in 
female labor force participation is associated with 0.45 fewer children per women. This slope 
has been relatively constant over time in the large sample.  
  However, the same relationship for high-income countries has shifted over time (see 
also Mira and Ahn, 2002). In 1970, high-income countries with low female labor force 
participation were also the ones with high fertility. The coefficient on this relationship in the 
1970 sample is not significantly different than in the 83-country sample in Figure 3. However, 
among high-income countries, this negative coefficient moves toward zero and becomes 
significantly different than the larger sample by 1980. By 1990, the coefficient in high-income 
countries between female labor force participation and fertility is not significantly different 
from zero. By 2000, the high-income country relationship between fertility and female 
participation is upward-sloping.
7 Figure 4 shows the relationship between female participation 
rates and fertility rates in high-income countries for 1995, the last year with complete data. The 
slope is 1.3 and is significant at the 5 percent level. Ireland is an obvious outlier. Dropping 
Ireland from the sample increases the slope to 2.0 with a significance level of 0.5 percent; in 
other words, a 10 percent increase in female labor force participation is associated with an 
increase in total fertility of 0.20 births per woman. 
  The underlying process here is that female labor force participation is rising in all high-
income countries from one decade to the next. The coincident changes in fertility suggest that 
the relationship between fertility and female labor force participation is U-shaped over time 
and that we just observe different pieces of the function in each decade. Below female labor 
force participation rates of 50–60 percent, there is a steep negative relationship between female 
                                                 
7 The relationship between fertility and female labor force participation for each of 1970, 1980, 1990, and 
2000 is shown graphically in Appendix Figure A1, available on-line with this paper at <http://www.e-
jep.org>.    10
labor force participation and fertility. Above 50–60 percent labor force participation for 
women, fertility rises modestly with additional female labor force participation.
8  
By the year 2000, women in countries like Denmark, Iceland, and Canada, faced 
relatively attractive conditions both in the labor market and in child-raising, and thus they 
supplied more market labor and more children relative to women in Japan and Italy. As Apps 
and Rees (2004) note, within Europe the countries with the lowest fertility are among those 
with the lowest rates of female labor force participation.  
 
Male Partners and Child Care 
Our hypothesis is that social attitudes towards women, both in the labor force and with 
regard to child-rearing, are affecting both labor force participation and fertility rates. Once the 
labor force is freely open to women, cross-country differences in fertility are driven both by 
social norms (specifically how much of the child-rearing burden falls on the mother) and by 
societal priorities as expressed by the amount of federal and state subsidies that governments 
provide to assist families and to encourage natality. The variables most positively correlated 
with fertility rates across the high-income countries appear to be: 1) the share of child care 
performed by male partners; and 2) the size of federal subsidies for day care. In other words, 
the more help women receive in raising young children, the more children they are willing to 
produce.  
  Low-fertility countries like Italy and Japan are also the ones in which men contribute 
the least in terms of child care relative to their spouses and partners. This pattern appears in a 
variety of datasets using several different measures of men's effort in child rearing or attitudes 
about the appropriate division of labor between mothers and fathers. Our results confirm those 
of De Laat and Sevilla Sanz (2006), who also use the International Social Survey Program 
(ISSP) data. Fernandez and Sevilla Sanz (2006) show with time use data that in Spain even 
women who earn more than their husbands perform a disproportionate share of the child care. 
Clearly, one needs to acknowledge the potential endogeneity of male production of child care 
and the possibility of reverse causality. Changes in fertility may cause changes in attitudes or 
                                                 
8 The direct effect of women entering the workforce (which means facing an increased opportunity cost of 
their time relative to the increase for men) on fertility may be negative, but the total effect across countries 
is positive when we consider that areas with higher status for women in the workplace also offer higher 
status for women in the household.   11
in male child care. In our view, two basic forces drive these societal changes in attitudes. First, 
labor markets are evolving in female-friendly directions in all counties around the world. For 
example, Galor and Weil (1996) argue that technological change has raised the relative market 
wages of women over time. This trend leads to increasing female participation rates over time. 
This change is related to the basic nature of work in technologically advanced societies and is 
exogenous with respect to fertility. The second factor generating heterogeneity in outcomes is 
longstanding attitudinal differences across countries.
9 These differing attitudes generate the 
observed variation in fertility across the high-income countries in Europe and North America. 
Figure 5 shows the share of “housework and caring for sick children” that is done 
by men (as assessed by the female partner) on the horizontal axis and the total fertility 
rate for the country on the vertical axis. Data on men’s share of housework/child care is 
available in the 1994 International Social Survey Program. Because we are seeking to 
focus on the share of housework/child care done by fathers as assessed by mothers, we 
limit the sample in each country to women with children under age five. At the country 
level, the “housework and caring for sick children” variable has a mean of 0.235 and a 
standard deviation of 0.041. The high fertility countries in this group—the United States, 
New Zealand, Denmark and Norway—are also the ones with the most equal division of 
labor between genders when it comes to housework/child care.
10 
One could also use time use data to measure how equally childcare responsibilities are 
divided between men and women. Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney (in this symposium) examine 
time spent performing child care by gender, across countries. The pattern they see across 
countries is broadly consistent with the ISSP measure we use. For example, their data imply 
that in the U.S. men spend about 48 percent as much time doing child care as women. In 
contrast, men in Germany spend about 37 percent as much time as women doing child care; the 
same number for Italy is 39 percent.  
                                                 
9 Time use data and participation rate data suggest that attitudes toward women are highly correlated over 
time within counties. Female participation rate rankings among the rich countries are relatively static 
between 1970 and 2000. 
10 The microlevel relationship between men’s percent of the housework/child care and family size goes 
consistently in the opposite direction: families in which the man does only a small fraction of the 
housework/child care are on average larger families. We interpret this pattern as reflecting sorting into 
family types—for instance, families where men are working and women are staying home with many 
children would contribute to this pattern.    12
   In Table 1, we further investigate the connection between men’s housework/child care 
and fertility. Column 1 of the table shows the regression coefficient from Figure 5. The 
coefficient on men’s share of the housework/child care is 4.2, which implies that a one-
standard-deviation increase in men's share of housework/child care is associated with an 
increase in the fertility rate of 0.17 children. In the second column, we use as the independent 
variable the female labor force participation rate in the 30–35 age group. The coefficient is 
positive but not significant.  
In the third column, we use per-child government spending on families as the 
independent variable. For these data, we use the OECD Social Expenditure (SOCX) 2007 
database, which measures governmental social spending on a variety of topics.
 11 We use 
federal government spending on families, which includes both cash benefits, such as family 
allowances and payments for maternity leave, and also in-kind benefits, including childcare 
subsidies or state-provided child care. We convert these data from percent of GDP to dollars 
per child in year 2000 (purchasing power parity) dollars. We use the log of spending per child 
under 15 as our right-hand-side variable. Column 3 of Table 1 shows that in a regression where 
log spending per child is the only regressor, a doubling of spending is associated with an 
increase in the fertility rate of 0.15 children, which is marginally significant, at the 10 percent 
level. This coefficient is consistent with the results of numerous (much more detailed) studies 
which find that pro-natalist policies work. For example, Björklund (2006) finds that large 
increases in family spending in Sweden during 1960–1980 raised completed fertility rates by 
0.4 children per women relative to other Scandanavian countries. Milligen (2005) finds that the 
elasticity of child subsidies to fertility rates in Quebec data is 0.107. In other words; in the long 
run, a doubling of subsidies (a 100 percent increase) leads to a 10.7 percent increase in 
birthrates, and hence total fertility rises by about 0.21 children. Whittington, Alm, and Peters 
(1990) estimate a 12 to 24 percent increase in the birthrate from a doubling of the personal 
exemption in the U.S. tax code, which corresponds to a 0.24 to 0.48 child increase in the total 
fertility rate. For similar results, see Sundström and Stafford (1992) for Sweden and McNown 
and Ridao-cano (2004) for Canada.  
                                                 
11 This is available at 
<http://www.oecd.org/document/9/0,3343,en_2649_34819_38141385_1_1_1_1,00.html>.   13
  When all three regressors are included (column 4 of Table 1), the share of 
housework/child care done by men is more correlated with fertility than is female labor force 
participation or family spending. Family spending and share of male housework/child care are, 
however, very highly correlated with each other. Societies that are more effective at sharing the 
burden of children across the genders also tend to be more generous in supporting children in 
the public sphere.
12 
  We also investigated possible connections between fertility rates and societal attitudes 
towards fathers performing child care and towards working mothers, using data from the 
World Values Survey. For example, we ran a regression with countries’ total fertility rates as 
the dependent variable and as the explanatory variable, the share of adults (men and women) 
who strongly agreed with the statement that “fathers are as suited as mothers for childcare.” 
We found a large and statistically significant relationship with fertility: a one-standard-
deviation increase in the percent of people in a country who agreed with that statement is 
associated with a 0.13 child increase in total fertility. Similarly, we ran a regression with the 
total fertility rate as the dependent variable and, as the explanatory variable, the percent of 
people in a country who agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that “a working mother 
can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not 
work.” A one-standard-deviation increase in the percent of respondents who agreed with that 
statement is associated with a .17 increase in the total fertility rate. This coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  
 
 
Types of Government Family Subsidies and Fertility 
  In Table 2, we use the same OECD data to look more deeply at the effects of various 
forms of government family subsidies on fertility. We have data on the number of legally 
required weeks of paid maternity and paternity leave, as well as various forms of family-related 
spending by the government as a percentage of GDP. Column 1 regresses the total fertility rate 
on federally mandated full-time equivalent paid weeks of maternity and paternity leave. An 
additional week of paid paternity leave is associated with a relatively small increase in total 
                                                 
12 We ran similar regressions using data from the 1994 wave of the ISSP and found 
similar results.   14
fertility of 0.03 children. The coefficient on weeks of maternity leave is negative and 
statistically significant in the “wrong” direction, although the effect is small. This finding may 
reflect the endogeneity of pro-child policies (countries with low fertility may respond by 
increasing maternity leave). The correlation between maternity and paternity leave is 
surprisingly small, but the general results are robust to including these coefficients separately. 
  In column 2, we switch to examining the effects of government spending on families on 
fertility. A one-percentage-point increase in spending as a percent of GDP (which would be 
roughly equal to doubling the level of spending at the mean, or an increase of two standard 
deviations) is associated with an increase of 0.12 children per woman. In column 3, we 
experiment with separating government spending on families into cash subsidies, federally 
provided services, and tax subsidies. The coefficients on all three categories are similar and 
only the coefficient on cash subsidies is marginally significant. All three forms of pro-family 
government spending appear to be associated with higher fertility, but we can't distinguish 
among their effects. 
  In column 4, we separate from the “services” category publicly provided preschool and 
day care. “Publicly provided day care” has the largest coefficient (0.37) relative to the other 
categories, although this variable is significant only at the 10 percent level. A doubling of 
spending on day care (from 0.37 percent of GDP to 0.74) is associated with 0.13 more children 
per woman. We take this as some evidence that publicly provided day care may be an effective 
pro-natalist policy. This finding is consistent with Blau and Robins (1989) and with Del Boca 
(2002), who finds large effects on fertility in Italy from increasing the availability of free day 
care for young children. 
  It may seem counterintuitive that modest levels of effort by men around the house, 
federal subsidies of a few thousand dollars per year, or even free day care can have a large 
effect on fertility, given that the time-related costs of raising a child remain very large. The 
financial costs of raising a child may be on the order of $11,600 per year (Lino, 2006). It may 
be that intuition is misguided here, and individuals’ fertility decisions are in fact very elastic 
with respect to cash subsidies and low-cost day care. However, there may also be peer effects 
or “social multipliers” in couples’ choices about number of children. It seems likely that people 
use their friends, family, and neighbors as a cue to decide how many children to have. For 
example, Fernandez and Fogli (2005) offer evidence on cultural effects on fertility, and Maurin   15
and Moschion (2006) present evidence on neighborhood effects. The post–World War II baby 
boom in the United States was far larger than would be justified by catching-up delayed 
fertility. Indeed, many of the cohorts of women who contributed to the baby boom were not 
even of child-bearing age during World War II. 
  In short, social attitudes and norms and subsidies to families, and day care in particular, 
play an important role in determining levels of fertility and appear to have enough influence to 
push developed countries above or below replacement level fertility.
13 These norms directly 
affect the opportunity costs that women face when they choose to have children, on both the 
extensive and intensive margins. 
 
Housing as an Equilibrating Mechanism for Fertility 
  One additional hypothesis sometimes suggested to explain differences in fertility across 
the high-income countries is that exogenous differences in housing costs might be driving 
different preferences for family size. After all, land is comparatively plentiful in the United 
States, and median housing sizes are much bigger in the United States than in Italy or Spain. 
The hypothesis that housing costs affect fertility also suggests an equilibrating mechanism for 
fertility. For example, low fertility could reduce the demand for housing, making housing less 
expensive and thus encouraging greater fertility.  
However, using country-level data or regional data within the United States, there is no 
evidence that housing prices have been a major driver of fertility. For the high-income 
countries as a whole, looking at housing cost data obtained from the OECD, neither levels nor 
changes in housing prices seem correlated with fertility rates. For regions within the United 
States, we calculate state-level total fertility from the 1980 and 2000 Censuses using the 
Individual Public Use Micro data, and gathered housing price data from the Office of Federal 
Housing Oversight’s repeat sales index (available at <http://www.ofheo.gov/>). If anything, 
the U.S. states and metropolitan statistical areas that have seen the largest increases in housing 
prices have also seen the largest relative increases in total fertility.  
                                                 
13 For example, a doubling of government spending on families is associated with an increase in the total 
fertility rate of 0.13 child, and a one-standard-deviation increase in the fraction of household work done by 
men is associated with an increase in the total fertility rate of 0.21 child. Combining these effects would be 
enough to move France, Norway, or the United Kingdom from below replacement rate fertility to above. 
However, Italy, Spain, Germany, and Japan had total fertility rates of 1.3 in 2005 and thus would not be 
moved above replacement rate fertility in this calculation.   16
  One can certainly argue that either the endogeneity of house prices and population or 
omitted variables (like income) make these correlations (or the lack of such correlations 
impossible to interpret. We suspect that the positive correlation between house price changes 
and fertility changes across U.S. states is partly driven by convergence in fertility rates across 
the states. The rural high fertility states in the Midwest (North Dakota), far West (Wyoming, 
Alaska), and South (Oklahoma) have seen rapid convergence towards the lower fertility levels 
of the Northeast and West Coast. Meanwhile the Northeast and California have had modest 
increases in fertility. However, the large increases in housing costs on the West Coast and in 
the Northeast likely have little to do with birth rates. 
 
Will the Fertility Trend in Europe and Japan Reverse? 
 
  The arguments of this paper suggest that, for a variety of reasons, high-income 
countries with the lowest fertility rates are likely to see an increase in fertility in the coming 
decades. If we think of labor force participation rates as a crude index of women’s status in the 
labor market, many of the European countries with the lowest birthrates also have the lowest 
levels of women’s labor force status. If the labor force status of women is gradually increasing 
(and all indications suggest that it is), the U-shaped relationship between female participation 
rates and fertility suggests that we should see modest increases in fertility in these high-income 
countries over the coming decades.  
Similarly, we have identified two indicators of the degree to which society shares the 
child-rearing burden with women: government spending on families (especially day care) and 
men's share of time spent on child care. Both of these indicators have a steep positive 
association with fertility and each appears to be trending upward in European countries. There 
has been a steady increase in men’s share of child care throughout the high-income countries 
during the last 25 years. Using the Multinational Time Use Survey, we compute the total hours 
per week of child care for own children produced by both men and women. We included all 
categories of child-related activities such as bathing children, cooking for children, caring for 
sick children, reading to children, and so on. We limit the samples to men and women ages 25–
55 with children age five and under in the household. At the country level, we calculate the 
fraction of such hours supplied by women. Figure 6 shows the results for five countries. In the   17
United States, for example, women were providing roughly 83 percent of the child care in 
1975, falling to 62 percent by 2000. The time trend was similar in the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, Canada, and Norway.  
  In Italy in the 1990s, women were doing about 73 percent of the child care—about 10 
percentage points more than U.S. women at the time. If Italian men were to increase their 
fraction of child care to the level of the U.S. men (and if we take our coefficients in Table 1 to 
represent a causal relationship), Italy would see a large 0.5 children per women increase in the 
total fertility rate. This calculation is of course speculative. In fact, men doing housework is 
probably not precisely the true variable of interest. Rather, it is a marker for how societies view 
the burden of raising children. Low-fertility, high-income countries have considerable scope 
for greater equality in the allocation of the burdens of child care between men and women.  
Public policy may play a role in raising birth rates as well. In general, government pro-
family spending has been trending upward over time. Average government spending on day 
care in the high-income countries of the OECD has more than doubled over the last 20 years. 
France appears to have generated a substantial increase in fertility in part by doubling child 
subsidies over the past 20 years. If the voters in Spain and Italy want to affect the same 
demographic transformation, it may be possible in these countries as well. 
Fertility rates in the high-income countries of the world appear to be determined by an 
array of social processes that go beyond the effects of relative wages, income, and labor force 
participation. A massive convergence in national fertility rates is leading to a world that looks 
very much like the low-fertility European countries in terms of the number of children per 
woman. However, in the lowest fertility European countries the progress of women is limited 
both in the workforce and in the household relative to other high-income countries. We see this 
as a temporary state. The social structure in these countries and the division of child care has 
led women to choose to have fewer children than did their mothers, but we see no reason why 
these social factors cannot also work in the other direction and lead to future increases in 
fertility. However, we readily confess that much remains to be learned about the effects of 
men’s and women’s allocation of childcare and household responsibilities and about the effects 
of pro-family government subsidies on changes in fertility rates. 
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Total Fertility Rate versus Male Housework/Childcare, Female Labor Force 
Participation Rate, and Federal Government Spending on Children 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)

















Female labor force 










Constant  0.025 1.148 0.511 -0.199
  (0.558) (0.433)** (0.634) (0.643)
Observations  18 18 17 17
R-squared  0.348 0.079 0.176 0.425
   
  
Sources: Total fertility rate is from United Nations data. “Spending per child” is the federal government’s 
family spending per child and is calculated from data at the OECD Social Expenditure Database. Female 
labor force participation is from the OECD. The male housework and childcare variable is from the 2002 
waves of the International Social Survey Program.  
Notes: We limit the sample to women with children in the household. The relevant question asks what 
portion of the housework and caring for sick children is done by their spouse or male partner. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   
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Table 2 
Total Fertility Rate versus Family Leave and Various Forms of Government 
Spending on Families 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 












Federally mandated paid maternity leave 
(full-time equivalent weeks) 
-0.024    
  (0.007)***    
Federally mandated paid paternity leave 
(full-time equivalent weeks) 
0.030    
  (0.015)*    
Federal family spending 
(as a percent of GDP) 
 0.122     
   (0.046)**     
Cash subsidies 
(as a percent of GDP) 
   0.114  
     (0.061)*  
Federally provided family services 
(as a percent of GDP) 
   0.137  
     (0.086)  
Tax subsidies to families 
(as a percent of GDP) 
   0.122  
     (0.174)  
Publicly provided preschool education 
(as a percent of GDP) 
    -0.129 
      (0.370) 
Publicly provided day care 
(percent of GDP) 
    0.367 
      (0.180)* 
Constant  1.865 1.324 1.322 1.552 
  (0.099)*** (0.125)*** (0.135)*** (0.130)*** 
Observations  23 23 23 22 
R-squared  0.404 0.254 0.256 0.203 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Figure 2 
Convergence in Fertility at the Country Level: Change in Total Fertility 1970–2000 




Source: Total fertility rates and changes are from United Nations data. 




eap- East Asia and Pacific, mena – Middle East and North Africa, we – Western Europe, ssa – Sub Saharan 
Africa, eca – East Central Asia, sa- South Asia, na – North America, lac – Latin America and Carribean 
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Figure 3 






Source: Total fertility rates are from United Nations data. Labor force participation rates are from the International 
Labour Organization.  
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Figure 4 






Source: Total fertility rates are from United Nations data. Labor force participation rates are from the International 
Labour Organization. 
Note: Points on graph are labeled using standard World Bank/UN country abbreviations available at 
<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49alpha.htm>. 
 
   27
Figure 5 




Sources: Total fertility rates are from United Nations data. Data on men's work are from the 2002 wave of the 
International Social Survey Program. 
Notes: Details on variable construction: We start with 4 survey question in which each household adult is asked 
who usually performs the following activities: 1) laundry, 2) caring for sick family members, 3) cleaning, 4) 
preparing meals. The possible responses in the raw data are 1) always me, 2) usually me, 3) about equal between 
me and my spouse, 4) usually my spouse, 5) always my spouse. We limit the sample to households with children 
under five and with both a man and woman present. We use the woman’s responses and convert the raw data to 
the percentage done by the man, as assessed by the woman. We use the following recoding of the data: “always 
the woman” = 0 percent done by the man; “usually the woman” = 25 percent done by the man; “about equal” = 50 
percent done by the man; “usually the man” = 75 percent done by the man; and “always the man” equals 100 
percent done by the man. We then average the percent done by the man across the four categories of housework. 
Points on graph are labeled using standard World Bank/UN country abbreviations available at 
<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49alpha.htm>. 
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Figure 6 
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Source: Data are from the Multinational Time Use Survey.  
Note: We limit the sample to men and women 25–55 who have children under five in the household. We calculate 
hours per week spent on child care for men and women and we average at the country level to find the proportion 
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Convergence in Fertility across Countries  
 
  (1) (2) (3) 










Total fertility rate 1970  0.499 0.531  0.53 
  (0.057)*** 
 
(0.054)*** (0.082)*** 
Female labor force participation rate, age 
30–34, 1970 
 1.854 1.853 
 
 
 (0.553)*** (0.574)*** 
ln(GDP per capita) 1970     -0.001 
 
 
   (0.186) 
Constant  0.302 –0.556 –0.544 
  (0.277) (0.363) (1.951) 
Observations  67 67 67 




Note: Total fertility rate, labor force participation rate, and GDP per capita data are from the United Nations 
database available at <http://unstats.un.org/>. Standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table A2 
Change in Completed Fertility Rate for Cohorts of Women Born 1940 and 1963, 
Extensive and Intensive Margins 
 
  Change in completed fertility 1940–1963 Levels of completed fertility for 1940 and 1963 cohorts 
  Completed 
fertility 
rate 






Extensive Extensive  Intensive  Intensive 
Country  change  share  share 1940 1963 1940 1963 1940 1963 
           
Ireland  -1.37  -0.38  -0.99 3.69 2.32 0.95 0.84 3.87 2.76 
Spain  -1.36  -0.21  -1.15 2.94 1.58 0.92 0.84 3.19 1.89 
Portugal  -0.81  -0.08  -0.73 2.58 1.76 0.94 0.91 2.73 1.94 
West Germany  -0.59  -0.54  -0.05 1.97 1.38 0.89 0.65 2.21 2.14 
Belgium  -0.59  -0.28  -0.30 2.17 1.58 0.91 0.78 2.38 2.02 
United Kingdom  -0.52  -0.36  -0.16 2.36 1.84 0.89 0.75 2.65 2.45 
France  -0.49  -0.17  -0.32 2.41 1.92 0.92 0.85 2.64 2.27 
Netherlands  -0.45  -0.17  -0.28 2.21 1.76 0.88 0.81 2.52 2.19 
Italy  -0.39  -0.12  -0.27 1.91 1.51 0.87 0.81 2.18 1.86 
Iceland  -0.38 0.26  -0.65 2.90 2.52 0.89 0.98 3.25 2.56 
Norway  -0.29  -0.04  -0.25 2.36 2.07 0.91 0.89 2.60 2.33 
Denmark  -0.22  -0.04  -0.18 2.10 1.88 0.90 0.88 2.33 2.13 
Finland  -0.12  -0.17 0.04 2.03 1.91 0.86 0.79 2.37 2.43 
Sweden  -0.04  -0.05 0.01 1.98 1.94 0.87 0.85 2.28 2.29 
           
         
      
      
 
Note: “Extensive margin” is defined as the percentage of women in the cohort having at least one child. “Intensive 
margin” is defined as the average number of children for women with at least one child. Completed fertility rates 
are calculated from birth records data available from Eurostat at <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu>. We take two 
cohorts of women (those born in 1940 and 1963) and calculate their completed fertility rates (children per 
woman). We decompose the change in completed fertility rate into the portions attributable to the extensive and 
intensive margins. We make use of the fact that “completed fertility rate” = “extensive margin” * “intensive 
margin.” We take logs and first-difference this identity to arrive at the decomposition. 
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Figure A1 
Total Fertility versus Labor Force Participation: 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 
 
 
Note: Points on graph are labeled using standard World Bank/UN country abbreviations available at 
<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49alpha.htm>. 
 
 
 
 
 
 